This study begins by examining the origins of the fair balance principle. There follows an analysis of the application of the principle across a range of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European Convention. The functions performed by the fair balance principle, together with the factors assessed by the Court when utilising the principle are distilled from the case-law. Conclusions are drawn as to the relationship between the fair balance principle and the margin of appreciation doctrine.
between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights." 4 A Grand Chamber of the current Court has explicitly endorsed that view. 5 Yet some of the most esteemed commentators on the Convention have observed, " [h] owever, the very notion of fair balance is obscure and amenable to a varying margin of appreciation..." 6 Therefore, we shall seek to discover the origins of, and functions performed, by this principle. That will involve examining the range of Articles under which it has been applied and the factors considered by the Court when utilising the principle. It will be important to ascertain what competing interests the Court identifies when undertaking the balancing process.
Additionally, it will be illuminating to determine if there are links between the fair balance principle and other general concepts enshrined in the Court's jurisprudence.
The Foundations of the Fair Balance Principle
In the very earliest case-law the original Court found an implied principle of "just balance" within the Convention.
"The Court considers that the general aim set for themselves by the Contracting Parties through the medium of the European Convention on Human Rights, was to provide effective protection of fundamental human rights, and this, without doubt not only because of the historical context in which the Convention was concluded, but also of the social and technical developments in our age which offer to States considerable possibilities for regulating the exercise of these rights. The Convention therefore implies a just balance between the protection of the general interest of the Community and the respect due to fundamental human rights while attaching particular importance to the latter."
So the basis of the principle was not the text of the particular Articles being litigated, prohibition of discrimination 8 in combination with the right to education 9 , but a basic requirement that member States achieve an appropriate equilibrium in safeguarding the well-being of their populations whilst protecting the fundamental rights of individuals against a background of rapid social, e.g. gender equality 10 , and technological, e.g.
interception of communications 11 , evolution. However, Judge Terje Wold categorically opposed the approach of the Plenary Court's majority:
"And even worse is the interpretation by the majority that the Convention "implies a just balance between the protection of the general interest of the community and the respect due to fundamental human rights". I strongly disagree with this interpretation. In my opinion it carries the Court into the very middle of the internal political questions of each Member State, which it has never been the intention that the Court should deal with."
12
Hence, we learn that judicial recognition of an implicit balancing principle in the Convention was controversial from its inception. We shall have to consider whether Judge Wold's fear that the application of the principle would encourage the Court to transgress beyond its jurisdiction into political decision-making has occurred when we have examined the later jurisprudence.
8 Article 14. The original Court later substituted the language of a "fair balance" for that of a "just balance". In Sporrong and Lonroth v Sweden 13 the applicant landowners had been subject to zonal expropriation permits and orders prohibiting construction on their land for many years. Eventually, the measures were rescinded when the local authority abandoned its planned developments. However, the applicants contended that the measures had interfered with their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their property 14 .
The plenary Court held that:
"For the purposes of the latter provision, the Court must determine whether a fair balance was struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights (see, mutatis mutandis, the judgment of 23 July 1968 in the "Belgian Linguistic" case, Series A no. 6, p. 32, par. 5). The search for this balance is inherent in the whole of the Convention and is also reflected in the structure of Article 1 (P1-1).
The Agent of the Government recognised the need for such a balance. At the hearing on" the morning of 23 February 1982, he pointed out that, under the Expropriation Act, an expropriation permit must not be issued if the public purpose in question can be achieved in a different way; when this is being assessed, full weight must be given both to the interests of the individual and to the public interest.
The Court has not overlooked this concern on the part of the legislature. Moreover, it finds it natural that, in an area as complex and difficult as that of the development of large cities, the Contracting States should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in order to implement their town-planning policy. Nevertheless, the Court cannot fail to exercise its power of review and must determine whether the requisite balance was maintained in a manner consonant with the applicants' right to "the peaceful enjoyment of [their] possessions", within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 1 (P1-1)."
15
A bare majority of the Court (ten votes to nine) went on to find a breach as the applicants had born an "excessive burden" in respect of the interferences with their 13 A.52 (1982) , 5 EHRR 35.
14 Article 1 of Protocol No 1.
15 Supra n.13 at para. 69.
properties (for up to twenty-five years) that "upset the fair balance which should be struck between the protection of the right of property and the requirements of the general interest".
16
Frustratingly for us the Court did not explain why it had altered the language of the just/fair balance principle. But we did learn that the "structure of" Article 1 of
Protocol No 1 (P1-1) provides a specific foundation for the fair balance principle. Whilst the text of P1-1 does not mention "fair balance" the Article expressly refers to allowing the deprivation of a person's possessions "in the public interest" and permitting States to control the use of property "in accordance with the general interest". Thereby requiring
States, and the Court when faced with a complaint under P1-1, to reconcile the property owner's right to the peaceful enjoyment of his/her possessions and arguments that community interests must prevail over the former.
The full-time Court has followed its predecessor's approach and in Jahn and , concluded that the legislative removal, by the Federal German Parliament, of the applicants' claims to agricultural land derived from an Act passed by the (former) "German Democratic Parliament" in 1990 did not breach P1-1. Even though the Federal legislation provided no compensation to the applicants the majority held that this was an exceptional situation. The applicants' claims were based upon a law enacted by a parliament that had not been democratically elected during the transition to a unified Germany.
"Having regard to all the foregoing considerations and taking account, in particular, of the uncertainty of the legal position of heirs and the grounds of social justice relied on by the German authorities, the Court concludes that in the unique context of German reunification, the lack of any compensation does not upset the "fair balance" which has to be struck between the protection of property and the requirements of the general interest." "A measure interfering with rights guaranteed by Article 8(1) of the Convention can be regarded as being "necessary in a democratic society" if it has been taken in order to respond to a pressing social need and if the means employed are proportionate to the aims pursued. The national authorities enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in this matter. The Court's task consists in ascertaining whether the impugned measures struck a fair balance between the relevant interests, namely the individual's rights protected by the Convention on the one hand and the community's interests on the other."
23
A majority of the Court (eleven votes) determined that the removal of the applicants did not strike a fair balance because they had been integrated into Latvian society and their relationship to a former USSR military officer did not pose a real danger to Latvian security. This was a significant judgment for its protection of the rights of individuals belonging to a minority in a newly emerging democracy.
From the above cases we have discovered that the principle of fair balance has ancient roots in the jurisprudence of the Court. Both the original and full-time Courts have traced the foundations of the principle to the nature of the Convention as a whole and to the requirements of specific Articles. Therefore, in the next section we shall examine how widespread the application of the principle is across the different rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention.
The range of Articles subject to the fair balance principle
The full-time Court has applied the fair balance principle when considering the right to "first of all that States face immense difficulties in modern times in protecting their communities from terrorist violence... It cannot therefore underestimate the scale of the danger of terrorism today and the threat it presents to the community. That must not, however, call into question the absolute nature of Article 3. 138. Accordingly, the Court cannot accept the argument of the United Kingdom Government, supported by the respondent Government, that a distinction must be drawn under Article 3 between treatment inflicted directly by a signatory State and treatment that might be inflicted by the authorities of another State, and that protection against this latter form of ill-treatment should be weighed against the interests of the community as a whole (see paragraphs 120 and 122 above). Since protection against the treatment prohibited by Article 3 is absolute, that provision imposes an obligation not to extradite or expel any person who, in the receiving country, would run the real risk of being subjected to such treatment. As the Court has repeatedly held, there can be no derogation from that rule (see the case-law cited in paragraph 130 above). It must therefore reaffirm the principle stated in the Chahal judgment (cited above, § 81) that it is not possible to weigh the risk of illtreatment against the reasons put forward for the expulsion in order to determine whether the responsibility of a State is engaged under Article 3, even where such treatment is inflicted by another State. In that connection, the conduct of the person concerned, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be taken into account..."
38
The Grand Chamber concluded that, having regard to reports of NGOs and the US State Department, the applicant had established substantial grounds for believing that if he was to be deported to Tunisia he would face a real risk of mal-treatment violating Article 3. No adequate diplomatic assurances of safeguards to protect the applicant had been given by Tunisia, therefore if Italy was to deport him to that country it would breach Article 3.
So despite the increased risks that member States face from international terrorism the full-time Court has continued its predecessor's refusal to countenance the application of a balancing test to the deportation/extradition of suspected terrorists and their associates. In maintaining its Chahal approach the Grand Chamber in Saadi continued treatment were in limited supply and expensive in Uganda. Eventually, the House of Lords rejected her appeal noting that it was doubtful if the member States of the Convention had intended it to apply in a manner requiring them to provide continuing medical care to the many persons in a similar predicament to the applicant.
Before the Grand Chamber the government submitted that Article 3 only applied to deportations being challenged on medical grounds in exceptional circumstances and here the applicant was not in the terminal stages of her illness as D. had been. The Grand Chamber held that:
"Although many of the rights it contains have implications of a social or economic nature, the Convention is essentially directed at the protection of civil and political rights (Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32, § 26). Furthermore, inherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights (see Soering v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 161, § 89). Advances in medical science, together with social and economic differences between countries, entail that the level of treatment available in the Contracting State and the country of origin may vary considerably. While it is necessary, given the fundamental importance of Article 3 in the Convention system, for the Court to retain a degree of flexibility to prevent expulsion in very exceptional cases, Article 3 does not place an obligation on the Contracting State to alleviate such disparities through the provision of free and unlimited health care to all aliens without a right to stay within its jurisdiction. A finding to the contrary would place too great a burden on the Contracting States.2 44 A majority (fourteen votes to three) concluded that as the applicant was not critically ill at that time her case could be distinguished from D. and there would be no breach of Article 3 if she was to be deported back to Uganda. The dissentients "strongly disagreed" with the majority's application of the fair balance principle to Article 3. "Even though certain "proportionalist errings", severely criticised in legal writings, existed at one time, particularly in the case-law of the old Commission We can hypothesize that the Grand Chamber in N. was willing to apply the fair balance principle to Article 3 due to the substance of the applicant's claim, which in effect was to be allowed to remain in the UK to receive ongoing medical care, as it involved difficult issues of public expenditure. Furthermore, the provision of health care
is not a right that is expressly contained in the Convention 49 , therefore States may legitimately claim the need to balance the allocation of public resources and the economic claims of individuals. As the Court noted in N.:
"The United Kingdom authorities have provided the applicant with medical and social assistance at public expense during the nine-year period it has taken for her asylum application and claims under Article 3 and 8 of the Convention to be determined by the domestic courts and this Court. However, this does not in itself entail a duty on the part of the respondent State to continue to provide for her."
50
The Court has also expressed apparently divergent views on the application of the fair balance principle to Article 5(1), the right to liberty and security. the Convention. The, unanimous Grand Chamber, held that "The Court does not accept the Government's argument that Article 5 § 1 permits a balance to be struck between the individual's right to liberty and the State's interest in protecting its population from terrorist threat. This argument is inconsistent not only with the Court's jurisprudence under sub-paragraph (f) but also with the principle that paragraphs (a) to (f) amount to an exhaustive list of exceptions and that only a narrow interpretation of these exceptions is compatible with the aims of Article 5. If detention does not fit within the confines of the paragraphs as interpreted by the Court, it cannot be made to fit by an appeal to the need to balance the interests of the State against those of the detainee." "Inherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights. As movement about the world becomes easier and crime takes on a larger international dimension, it is increasingly in the interest of all nations that suspected offenders who flee abroad should be brought to justice. Conversely, the establishment of safe havens for fugitives would not only result in danger for the State obliged to harbour the protected person but also tend to undermine the foundations of extradition..."
55
The Grand Chamber then went on to determine that the highly controversial arrest of the applicant, leader of a terrorist organisation, by Turkish officials at Nairobi airport did not 55 Ibid. at para. 88.
56 A.145 (1988) . 11 EHRR 117.
57 Ibid. at para. 48.
"Striking a fair balance between the interests of the community that suffers from terrorism and those of the individual is particularly difficult and national authorities, who from long and painful experience have acquired a far better insight into the requirements of effectively combating terrorism and of protecting their citizens than an international judge can ever hope to acquire from print, are in principle in a better position to do so than that judge!"
58
Given the scale of the terrorism concerning Northern Ireland, the democratic tradition of the UK and the annual reviews of the anti-terrorism legislation he concluded that the maximum length of police detention authorised (seven days) did not breach Article 5(3).
So even when the Court has recognised the need to apply the fair balance principle to
Article 5 complaints how the balance is to be assessed according to the particular facts of the case may be a matter of dispute amongst the judges. "However, certain special circumstances of the case may reveal that the actual manner in which it was used impaired the very essence of a fair trial. In particular, the Court has to assess whether, in a given case, the power to launch and conduct a supervisory review was exercised by the authorities so as to strike, to the maximum extent possible, a fair balance between the interests of the individual and the need to ensure the effectiveness of the system of criminal justice." Grand Chamber, by twelve votes to five, found no breach of Article 8 due to the detailed controls over night flights using the airport.
"In these circumstances the Court does not find that, in substance, the authorities overstepped their margin of appreciation by failing to strike a fair balance between the right of the individuals affected by those regulations to respect for their private life and home, and the conflicting interests of others and of the community as a whole, nor does it find that there have been fundamental procedural flaws in the preparation of the 1993 regulations on limitations for night flights." "The issue before the Court is, however, whether the concrete measures chosen by the authorities could be accepted as lawful and necessary in a democratic society and, in particular, whether those measures were proportionate and struck a fair balance between the declared aim of securing legality and the rights of the individuals and organisations concerned." "Although it is legitimate for a State to impose on civil servants, on account of their status, a duty of discretion, civil servants are individuals and, as such, qualify for the protection of Article 10 of the Convention. It therefore falls to the Court, having regard to the circumstances of each case, to determine whether a fair balance has been struck between the fundamental right of the individual to freedom of expression and the legitimate interest of a democratic State in ensuring that its civil service properly furthers the purposes enumerated in Article 10 para. 2. In carrying out this review, the Court will bear in mind that whenever civil servants' right to freedom of expression is in issue the "duties and responsibilities" referred to in Article 10 para. 2 assume a special significance, which justifies leaving to the national authorities a certain margin of appreciation in determining whether the impugned interference is proportionate to the above aim."
72
By a bare majority of one the Grand Chamber concluded that the dismissal of the applicant was a disproportionate measure given her good teaching record. , the full-time Court was confronted with the argument that the applicants' right to political expression had been infringed as domestic law accorded the private owners of a town centre shopping-complex power to deny the applicants permission to campaign for public support, on the future of a local park, in the complex. The Court considered that the applicants' complaint involved the question whether the respondent State was in breach of its positive obligation to protect freedom of expression.
"In determining whether or not a positive obligation exists, regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest of the community and the interests of the individual, the search for which is inherent throughout the Convention. The scope of this obligation will inevitably vary, having regard to the diversity of situations obtaining in Contracting States and the choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources. Nor must such an obligation be interpreted in such a way as to impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities."
74
Given that the applicants had alternative methods of campaigning, such as visiting residents' homes or via the local media, a majority of the Court (six votes to one) found that the UK had not failed to protect the applicants' freedom of expression.
As Article 10 has a similar structure to that of Article 8 we should not be surprised The applicants had ethical objections to hunting, but the government claimed that the legislation could be justified under Article 11(2) as being necessary to enable wide public participation in hunting. The Grand Chamber considered that:
"To compel a person by law to join an association such that it is fundamentally contrary to his own convictions to be a member of it, and to oblige him, on account of his membership of that association, to transfer his rights over the land he owns so that the association in question can attain objectives of which he disapproves, goes beyond what is necessary to ensure that a fair balance is struck between conflicting interests and cannot be considered proportionate to the aim pursued." 76 Therefore, a large majority, twelve vote to five, concluded that the applicants had suffered a breach of Article 11.
We have already examined the origins of the Court's application of the fair balance principle in the context of complaints alleging discriminatory treatment violating "It must be recalled that under the Convention, there exist two types of proportionality evaluation emphasised by the Strasbourg organs. Firstly, they have asserted that a "fair balance" must be struck between the right of individual applicants and the general interests of the public. ...The second meaning of proportionality is a modified and more specific version of the first and defined as a reasonable relationship between the means employed, including their severity and duration, and the public objective to be sought." "Not only must an interference with the right of property pursue, on the facts as well as in principle, a "legitimate aim" in the "general interest", but there must also be a reasonable relation of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised by any measures applied by the State, including measures designed to control the use of the individual's property. That requirement is expressed by the notion of a "fair balance" that must be struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights. The concern to achieve this balance is reflected in the structure of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 as a whole. In each case involving an alleged violation of that Article the Court must therefore ascertain whether by reason of the State's interference the person concerned had to bear a disproportionate and excessive burden..." 88 Unanimously, the Grand Chamber found that the Polish legislation pursued the legitimate aim of seeking to deal with the chronic shortage of homes. But: "...the Polish State, which inherited from the communist regime the acute shortage of flats available for lease at an affordable level of rent, had to balance the exceptionally difficult and socially sensitive issues involved in reconciling the conflicting interests of landlords and tenants. It had, on the one hand, to secure the protection of the property rights of the former and, on the other, to respect the social rights of the latter, often vulnerable individuals. Nevertheless, the legitimate interests of the community in such situations call for a fair distribution of the social and financial burden involved in the transformation and reform of the country's housing supply. This burden cannot, as in the present case, be placed on one particular social group, however important the interests of the other group or the community as a whole. In the light of the foregoing, and having regard to the effects of the operation of the rent-control legislation during the whole period under consideration on the rights of the applicant and other persons in a similar situation, the Court considers that the Polish State has failed to strike the requisite fair balance between the general interests of the community and the protection of the right of property." "...whether, in view of the importance of the execution of its judgments in the Convention system and the applicable principles, the respondent State had a positive obligation to take the necessary measures to allow the television commercial in issue to be broadcast following the Court's finding of a violation of Article 10. In determining whether such an obligation exists, regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest of the community and the interests of the individual." States were to be accorded a wide margin of appreciation in legislating when cultural property should be taken into public ownership. However:
"Compensation terms under the relevant domestic legislation are material to the assessment whether the contested measure respects the requisite fair balance... Legitimate objectives of "public interest" may call for less than reimbursement of the full market value of the expropriated property... In the Court's view, the protection of the historical and cultural heritage is one such objective."
114
As Turkish law prevented any compensation being paid in respect of the historical and cultural value of the applicant's building it was unfair and he had suffered a breach of Article 1. The Grand Chamber, by sixteen votes to one, determined that 75,000 euro pecuniary compensation should be paid. Hence whilst the Court was willing to recognise
States' programmes of cultural protection, where possessions are expropriated in the public interest appropriate levels of compensation must be paid.
Conclusions
From our study we have discovered that the fair balance principle is a judicial creation which the Court declares has its origins in the essence of the Convention where member
States undertake to respect the fundamental rights of persons guaranteed by the ECHR whilst also promoting the general interests of their populations. In addition certain 
